Introduction:
The Introduction establishes the broader context of Islamic jurisprudence, pointing out that the Islamic religion is represented by two major directions: Sunni and Shia. Each direction maintains its own legal doctrine embodied in distinct legal schools (madhhabs) with unique sources of law. The author emphasizes that the emergence of these legal schools was shaped by historical, religious, political, social, and economic factors. Referencing the legal historian Joseph Schacht, the text notes that essential features of Islamic law and its legal institutions emerged in the first century of the Hijri era.
The narrative singles out two pivotal events occurring immediately after the Prophet Muhammad's death during the reign of the first Caliph, Abu Bakr: the political confrontation regarding the election of the caliph at Saqifa and the legal dispute over the lands of Fadak. The text notes that Ali ibn Abi Talib was notably absent from the initial oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr, an event highlighted by Shia scholars as one of the earliest manifestations of Shia ideology. To illustrate the Fadak dispute, the text quotes a foundational Hadith from Sahih Bukhari where Aisha describes Fatima requesting her inheritance from the Fai property in Medina, Fadak, and Khibar, and Abu Bakr refusing based on his statement that prophets leave no inheritance and that whatever they leave becomes charity (sadaqa). The introduction asserts that these two events played a definitive role in laying the foundations for the division of the Muslim community (ummah) and shaping the unique legal systems of both Sunni and Shia Islam.
Materials and Methods:
In the Materials and Methods section, the author justifies the necessity of studying Islamic law due to its status as one of the world's largest religious legal systems, governing over 1.5 billion people globally. The text discusses contemporary comparative law theories, referencing legal scholars such as Ugo Mattei, Boris Mamlyuk, and V. V. Palmer, to highlight how traditional boundaries between legal systems have softened, making the study of mixed legal systems and non-Western traditions increasingly relevant for global legal integration.
The author critiques a widespread flaw in academic literature: treating Islamic law as a monolithic entity and applying conclusions drawn exclusively from Sunni law to the entirety of Islamic jurisprudence. Specifically, the common attribution of the 'four sources of law' (Quran, Sunnah, ijma, and qiyas) as universal across Islam is shown to be inaccurate, as it does not reflect Shia jurisprudence. The text outlines the internal structure of Shia law, noting its division into Twelver (Imamiyyah) and Zaidi madhhabs, and further detailing the Usuli and Akhbari schools within Twelver thought, alongside internal debates regarding political authority and the concept of 'wilayat al-fakih'.
To analyze the legal aspects of Saqifa and Fadak, the author employs a comparative-legal methodology (comparative fiqh), historical-biographical methods, critical event analysis following criteria set by Markus Dubber, and theological-philological hermeneutics. The review of literature acknowledges key Western and Eastern scholars who examined Shiism and these historical events, including Dwight Donaldson, Heinz Halm, Moojan Momen, Norman Calder, Hossein Modarressi, Abdulaziz Sachedina, Wael Hallaq, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, G. Kh. Muharrami, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, and Seyid Mohammed Wahidi. The author notes that while these scholars addressed historical and theological elements, the present study specifically isolates the legal context and procedural aspects that led to the formation of legal sources.
1 Conflict About Giving the Oath (Events of Saqifa):
This section provides a detailed jurisprudential and historical breakdown of the conflict surrounding the oath of allegiance (bay'ah). It begins by establishing Ali ibn Abi Talib's preeminent standing as the Prophet's cousin, son-in-law, and one of the most knowledgeable companions, citing the famous Hadith: 'I am the house of wisdom, and Ali is its door.' The text explains the critical role of bay'ah in early Islamic society as a formal legal contract or covenant binding leaders and followers, the violation of which was considered a severe offense by early scholars.
The narrative examines the historical circumstances surrounding the deathbed of the Prophet, citing the Hadith of the 'calamity of Thursday' (recorded by Ibn Abbas in Bukhari and Muslim) where Umar bin Al-Khattab objected to writing a final statement, stating that the Quran was sufficient. It then details the meeting at Saqifa—a covered gathering place in Medina—where the Ansar (indigenous Medinans) gathered to choose a local leader. Upon learning of this, Muhajirun leaders Abu Bakr, Umar, and Abu Ubaydah rushed to Saqifa. Abu Bakr delivered a speech asserting the superiority and tribal entitlement of the Quraysh, while Umar forcefully advocated for Abu Bakr, ultimately leading to Abu Bakr's election as Caliph. Historical accounts from al-Tabari, Wilferd Madelung, and Moojan Momen illustrate that clan rivalries between the Ansar tribes of Aws and Khazraj facilitated this outcome, although several figures, such as Saad ibn Ubeida, refused allegiance.
Ali's delayed allegiance is analyzed from both Sunni and Shia viewpoints. Sunni sources, such as historian Sheikh al-Qudari, present Ali as expressing grievance for being excluded from consultation while eventually recognizing Abu Bakr's position. Shia sources, such as Tabarsi's Al-Ihtijaj, record that Ali and twelve prominent companions protested the election as a violation of the Prophet's explicit designation of Ali at Ghadir Khumm and Banu Khadir, maintaining silence only to prevent violent schism and protect the nascent Muslim community. From a legal standpoint, the author demonstrates how Sunnis used the election at Saqifa to legitimize majority consensus (ijma) as a primary derivative source of law, supported by Hadiths such as 'My nation will not unite on misguidance.' Conversely, Shia jurisprudence rejected majority-based consensus, restricting ijma to agreements that reveal the position of the infallible Imam, and elevated intellect ('aql) and rational derivation as central sources of law.
2 Fadak:
This section delivers a thorough legal analysis of the litigation regarding Fadak, a fertile oasis near Khaibar that came under Muslim administration following a peace treaty. The text outlines the two primary legal arguments presented by Fatima: first, that Fadak was bestowed upon her by the Prophet as an oral gift during his lifetime; second, that she was the direct and sole heir to the Prophet's estate.
In response to her gift claim, Abu Bakr required Fatima to produce two male witnesses or one male and two female witnesses in accordance with Islamic procedural law. Fatima presented her husband Ali and Umm Ayman (a revered companion promised Paradise). Umar rejected these witnesses, arguing that Ali was a biased witness with a direct financial interest in his wife's estate and that a single woman's testimony was legally insufficient. In response to her inheritance claim, Abu Bakr cited a Hadith stating that prophets do not leave inheritance and that their estate becomes charity. Fatima and Ali contested this statement by citing Quranic verses depicting prophets leaving inheritance, such as Surah An-Naml (27:16: 'And Solomon inherited David') and Surah Maryam (19:5-6: Zechariah's prayer for an heir). Sunni scholars, such as Sheikh Uthman Al-Khamis, interpreted these verses as referring to the inheritance of prophetic knowledge rather than material property.
The author highlights the procedural and theoretical contradictions exposed by this litigation. A comparative narrative involving the companion Jabir ibn Abdillah shows that Abu Bakr accepted Jabir's uncorroborated oral claim regarding a financial promise from the Prophet without requiring witnesses, a precedent cited by Sunni jurist Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani to establish that a Companion's statement is legally binding even in their own favor. Shia scholars, such as Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Seyid Muhammad Wahidi, questioned why Jabir's testimony was accepted while Fatima's and Ali's were rejected. The section also links Umar's rejection of testimony based on personal interest to contemporary judicial reasoning in Pakistani Sharia courts regarding inheritance disputes (e.g., Qamar Sultan v. Bibi Sufiadan).
Finally, the dispute over Fadak solidified core jurisprudential concepts. For Sunnis, Abu Bakr's decision was validated through the doctrine of juristic interpretation (ijtihad), holding that companions who perform ijtihad are rewarded regardless of error, based on the collective righteousness of all Companions (Sahaba). For Shias, Fatima and the Imams of Ahl al-Bayt are considered infallible (ma'sum), meaning their statements constitute part of the Sunnah itself, making external witness requirements or contrary companion claims legally invalid.
Conclusion:
The Conclusion summarizes the primary findings of the study, reiterating that the early historical events of Saqifa and Fadak directly created the doctrinal framework for Sunni and Shia legal theories. It contrasts the two systems across the primary and derivative sources of law:
1. Quran: Both Sunni and Shia traditions recognize the textual integrity and absolute authority of the Quran. However, they differ in exegesis (tafsir); Shia law considers the Ahl al-Bayt as the exclusive authoritative interpreters of the Quran based on Hadith Sakalein ('The Book of Allah and my family'), whereas Sunni law accepts interpretations from prominent Companions such as Ibn Abbas.
2. Sunnah: Sunnis define Sunnah through traditions transmitted by any righteous Companion (Sahaba), allowing for errors through ijtihad. Shias extend the concept of Sunnah to include the statements, actions, and approvals of the fourteen infallible figures (the Prophet, Fatima, and the twelve Imams), while rejecting narrations from companions who displayed hostility toward Ahl al-Bayt.
3. Ijma (Consensus): In Sunni jurisprudence, ijma developed as a core source of law representing the unanimous agreement of scholars or companions, grounded in the majority principle established at Saqifa. In Shia jurisprudence, ijma is not an independent source of authority unless it leads to discovering the explicit opinion of an infallible Imam.
4. Qiyas / Ijtihad versus 'Aql: Sunni jurisprudence adopted analogical reasoning (qiyas) and personal juristic discretion as the fourth source of law. Twelver Shia jurisprudence rejected qiyas and personal opinion-based ijtihad, replacing them with intellect ('aql) and rational deductive principles (usul al-fiqh) to extract law directly from the Quran and Sunnah. Thus, the author concludes that early political and legal disputes were the foundational catalysts for the distinct legal doctrines operating in Islamic law today.